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No-Fault Compensation for Victims of Road
Accidents: Can it be Justified?
RICHARD LEWIS*
ABSTRACT
This article considers the reasons given for the creation of a no-fault
compensation scheme for victims of road accidents. In particular the article
examines the work of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compen-
sation for Personal Injury1 and evaluates its proposals by reference to its
analysis of whether preferential treatment for road accidents can be justified.
The policy options for the future development of welfare provision for the
disabled are thereby thrown into sharp relief: each justification given is of
relevance to other accident victims; the political nature of the reform is
exposed when considering why one particular group is to be preferred to
another; and the rationale supporting the existence of the many regimes of
compensation in tort and social security is called into question. The role of
Commissions in policy making and the structural limitations upon their
deliberations are also discussed. In sum the article provides a case study of
what has been called 'the strain of seeking to justify the different treatment
for various categories of misfortune'.2
This article does not set out in any detail the Pearson Commission's no-fault
scheme for road accidents,3 nor does it attempt comparison with schemes
already in existence, such as those in North America.4 There is considerable
• Lecturer in Law, University College, Cardiff.
1
 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury
(Pearson Report), Vol. I, Report; Vol. II, Statistics and Costings; Vol. Ill, Overseas
Systems of Compensation, Cmnd. 7054-I, 7054-II, 7054-III, HMSO, London, 1978. In
this article all references are to Vol. I unless otherwise stated.
2
 T. G. Ison, The Forensic Lottery, Staples Press, London, 1967, p. 35.
3
 See F. A. Trindale, 'A No-Fault Scheme for Road Accident Victims in the United
Kingdom' Law Quarterly Review 96 (1980), 581.
4
 See the Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for
Personal Injury, Vol. III. Chapter 3 deals with the U.S.A. and Annex 2 gives a summary
of the provisions of the no-fault laws in those States which have adopted them. For an
earlier review see A. Tune, 'Traffic Accident Compensation: Law and Proposals',
International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol. XI, Ch. 14, Oceana Publications
Inc., New York, 1970. The most recent European book to review traffic accident compen-
sation is D. Simeons, Vergoerding Voor Verkeusslachteroffers, Antwerp, 1979.
0047-2794/81/0000-58 $02.00 © 1981 Cambridge University Press.
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literature describing the substantive merits of individual schemes but few
commentators have concerned themselves with the fundamental question of
why road accidents should be singled out for reform." The implicit assump-
tions may be that reform must start somewhere and that traffic victims are
in the greatest need of changes in our compensation system. With regard to
North America these attitudes are reinforced by a reluctance either to
antagonize the private insurance lobby or to further 'socialise' the welfare
system. This article does not attempt to criticize foreign schemes, nor does
it evaluate their particular reasons, if stated, for treating road accidents
differently from others. Only British proposals for reform are examined
and attention is focused almost exclusively upon the justifications they give
for separate treatment.
Before looking at these justifications, it is necessary to consider the
broader background to compensation for all kinds of accidents so that road
accidents can then be placed in their context. In particular, objections to
the varying bases of the many regimes of compensation should be noted.
The differing schemes are the product of the gradual development of the
welfare system, but a strong case now can be made against needless addition
to this complex pattern of compensation.
The various groups of disabled have benefitted unequally and some would
say unfairly from the welfare system. Because of the lack of any general
strategy statutory reform has created many anomalies and it is only in
recent years that welfare legislation has attracted the study it deserves. The
disabled have suffered further from the vicissitudes of the common law
in its ad hoc dealings with compensation cases. Although more attention
has been paid to the common law rather than statute, exposition of legal
principle has not been made any the easier: compensation from the law of
tort may nominally be based upon the simple principle of proving the fault
of another, but in practice a case can prove far from easy and may reveal a
myriad of detailed sub-rules and principles. The 'when, where and how' of
an accident still determine which of the many formulae for liability will be
applied. Examining both statute and common law in the fields of tort and
social security one writer recently found that for disabilities caused by
accidents alone there are seventeen different categories of financial support,
each dependent upon proving a precise cause of injury (examples being a
criminal attack, a dangerous animal, a falling building, a plane crash, etc.).6
6
 See, for example, T. G. Ison bemoaning the failure of the British Columbia Royal
Commission on Automobile Insurance to even raise this 'fundamental question, going
to the root of the inquiry' in 'Highway Accidents and the Demise of Tort Liability',
Canadian Bar Review, 47 (1969), 304, 309.
8 D . M. Harris, 'An appraisal of the Pearson strategy' in D. K. Allen, C. J. Bourn,
J. H. Holyoak (eds), Accident Compensation After Pearson, Sweet & Maxwell, London,
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The needs of the victim are ignored, the cause of the injury is all important.
This diversity is the product of a piecemeal approach to compensation
and results in anomalies in the treatment of one group of disabled as opposed
to another. The headline-catching successes of the system in awarding
more than a quarter of a million pounds to the individual severely injured
through the fault of another can be matched by failure to cope with the
person injured in perhaps less dramatic but equally painful and needy
circumstances. The alternative to this disjointed process is for there to be a
comprehensive review of the principles upon which compensation is based.
To remove what the severest critics consider needless complexity and incon-
sistency they have demanded that the problems of the disabled be viewed
as a whole. A uniform disability benefit has been proposed.7 Whatever the
arguments in favour of radical change, it is sufficient here to note that the
present structure attracts considerable criticism and any proposals for reform
must be viewed with this in mind. What reasons can be adduced for making
further subdivisions to fragment the position of the disabled ? In particular,
what reason can there be for isolating road accidents and establishing
another preferred class of beneficiaries ?
The Pearson Commission had five years to consider this major problem,
but it eventually devoted little space to the difficulties involved. It recog-
nized that criticism of the present provision for road accident victims could
be applied equally to compensation awarded for other kinds of injuries.8
But in a few short paragraphs9 it dismissed objections to the preferment of
road casualties and established a case for the introduction of a no-fault
scheme along the lines of that for industrial injuries. By contrast much
more space was devoted to the financing of the scheme. Indeed according to
the headline writers of the national newspapers, the keynote of Lord
'979. PP- 86-8. For those disabled irrespective of cause it has been estimated that there
are 54 different forms of financial assistance - see The Consumers Association, Managing
at Home - A Which? Campaign Report, London, 1978. Lord Plowden therefore refers to
'the Kafka-like world in which the disabled and handicapped have to exist', in
J. Simkins and V. Tickner, Whose Benefit? An Examination of The Existing System of
Cash Benefits and Related Provision for Intrinsically Handicapped Adults and Their
Families, Economist Intelligence Unit Report, London, 1978, p. 11.
7
 See, for example, V. George, Social Security: Beveridge and After, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, London, 1968, p. 186; The Disablement Income Group, Creating a National Dis-
ability Income, Occasional Paper No. 12, London, 1972; The Disability Alliance, Poverty
and Disability: the Case for a Comprehensive Income Scheme for all Disabled People,
London, 1975; one of the 'three schools of thought' within the Pearson Commission
believed that a single disability allowance was a 'socially desirable objective' but was
prevented by its terms of reference from considering any details. See the Report of the
Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury, paras. 264
and 1713.
8
 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury, para. 995.
8
 Ibid, paras. 996-8.
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Pearson's proposals was the levy of a penny on a gallon of petrol in order to
pay for the road accident scheme.10
This lack of discussion of the fundamental issues combined with an over-
concentration upon the details of the scheme reveals, according to Atiyah,
the Commission's failure to come to terms with an overall strategy:
For road accident victims do not form a coherent class of victims defined by any
social welfare policy, and their selection as a group for this favoured treatment
is purely a pragmatic and totally unprincipled proposal for the extension of the
welfare system.11
A member of the Commission, Lord Allen, finds such comments hard to
accept:
I do not think it presumptuous to claim that we did indeed work out a coherent
pattern and that we explained with some care just why we concluded, for
example, that in some areas an extension of 'no fault' was appropriate and that,
in others, strict liability was the right course.. .12
This article will examine seven justifications given by the Pearson Com-
mission and others for the extension of no-fault compensation to road
accidents alone. The reasons are:
(1) Preferences favouring other groups of disabled exist elsewhere.
(2) A road accident scheme would have maximum effect upon the number
of people to be compensated, whilst
(3) it would only involve minimum disturbance of existing principles.
(4) Reform is required because of the essentially dangerous nature of motor
vehicles, and
(5) because of the importance of road transport to society.
(6) The scheme would satisfy demand for an equitable selection of bene-
ficiaries, and
10
 See The Times and the Guardian, 17 March 1978.
11
 P. S. Atiyah, 'What Now?', in Allen et. al, op. cit. p. 230. Similarly H. L. Weyers, 'The
Economic Treatment of Traffic Accident Facts and Perspectives in the Federal Republic
of Germany', Afetuele Probletnen van verzekeringsrec Jit, Ghent, 1974, p. 81, complains
that German reforms have given too little consideration to the goals of the social
security system as a whole. 'There is no reason whatever to give traffic accidents special
treatment. Such a move might be justified by technical reasons, in a long term strategy
of social security. If you cannot get wholesale social security, it seems rational to start
where grievances are deepest and success seems politically attainable. But even then the
details of planning for traffic accidents have to be subordinated to this overall concept
and they cannot be justified, at least in an academic discussion - things may be different
in day to day politics -, on grounds deriving from the situation of the traffic victim
alone'.
12
 Introduction to Allen et. ah, op. cit. p. 8. Another Commissioner has written in a
similar vein suggesting that lack of principle is 'said with greater propriety about the
views of its critics' rather than the views of the Commission itself. See N. S. Marsh,
'The Pearson Report', Law Quarterly Review, 95 (1979), 514. But the author goes on to
admit that the Commission's justification for separate treatment of road accidents was
'not in itself.. .entirely adequate'.
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(7) would be consonant with public attitudes to suffering and compensa-
tion.
(l) PREFERENCES EXIST IN OTHER AREAS
The first argument in favour of a special scheme for road accidents points
to the existence of other disabled groups already enjoying higher benefits
and asks if these are to benefit, why not others?13 The advantaged group
often referred to in this context is the industrially injured for accident
compensation has proceeded upon the basis that the employee injured whilst
doing his job is to be given preferential treatment. Workmen's compensa-
tion has been awarded irrespective of the fault of the employer or his
capacity to pay. The workmen's compensation scheme and the later indus-
trial injuries scheme ensured that the employee received benefits over and
above those made available to the sick or otherwise disabled. Although this
preference formed the cornerstone upon which the welfare state was built,
it nevertheless has attracted much criticism. Why should an employee at
work be considered more valuable to society than when he is on the way to
work or at home? If the employee at home should be able to claim equal
treatment, why not the unemployed spouse injured whilst cleaning the
house? In such attacks upon the industrial preference a case is made for
extending the range of accidents deserving of compensation: ultimately it
may then be argued that a uniform approach should be adopted and the
disabled should be treated according to their need and not the cause of their
impairment.
These arguments were well known to Lord Beveridge but with some
reluctance he decided to retain the preference, albeit in a more limited form
than eventually emerged.14 The reasons he gave seem weak nowadays15 and
Lord Pearson recognized that Beveridge's arguments should carry 'a good
deal less weight now'.10 Typical of modern comments on the preference is
that of the International Labour Organization which concludes that the
13
 See H. D. Orris, "The Road Injuries No-fault Compensation Scheme', Justice of the
Peace, 144 (1980), 24.
14
 Social Insurance and Allied Services (Beveridge Report), Cmd. 6404, HMSO, London, 1942.
15
 Ibid, paras. 81-5. The reasons have been criticized by A. F. Young, Industrial Injuries
Insurance, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1964, p. x and pp. 90-2, George, op. cit.
p. 184; H. Calvert, Social Security Law, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1978, pp. 311-12;
A. I. Ogus and E. M. Barendt, The Law of Social Security, Butterworths, London, 1978, pp.
299-300; P. S. Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
London, 1980, p. 368; T. Higucha, 'The Special Treatment of Employment Injury in Social
Security', International Labour Review, 102 (1970), 109; R. K. Lewis, 'Tort and Social
Security: The Importance Attached to the Cause of Disability with Special Reference to
the Industrial Injuries Scheme', Modern Law Review, 43 (1980), 514.
10
 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury, para. 29a.
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distinction between work and other accidents is 'increasingly anomalous'
and traditional practice is the main obstacle to change.17
What has been the effect upon road accident reform of these attacks upon
the industrial preference ? On the one hand it might be said that the same
criticisms could be made of any new road accident preference. Moreover,
there are no historical reasons to justify the difference in treatment between
road accident victims and others. On the other hand it could be argued that
rather than two preferences being created, one preference only is involved
and even that is being diminished in importance as a result of the reform.
Such a view would be taken by those who favour reform of the present
system but who consider radical change to be too expensive or precipitate.
Instead they favour a gradual withering away of the anomalies; if the status
of road accident victims is raised to that of the industrially injured it may
mark the beginning of the erosion of preferential benefits. This argument is
half embraced by Lord Pearson: 'Identical rates of benefit would conform
to our aim of reducing the anomalies between different groups of accident
victims, and there would be one level less to administer'.18 This argument in
favour of gradual change has been thought to be a strong one.19 It was the
basis of Professor Atiyah's support for a road accident scheme in his evidence
to the Pearson Commission. A framework of insurance already exists, the
group of victims is limited and easily identifiable, and their needs apparent.
As the Justice Report observed:
It is only in the case of road traffic accidents, therefore, that substantial new
benefits can quickly be obtained at little cost. It is no answer to a proposal to
put right a serious injustice that there are other injustices which should also be
remedied, and that the proposed reform should not be implemented because it
will not mitigate those other injustices also.. .Partial reform is better than no
reform at all.20
However, the Pearson Commission cannot rely upon these arguments for it
17
 Ibid., Vol. Ill, para. 1009. But see the preference reconsidered by the DHSS in Industrial
Injuries Compensation - A Discussion Document, London, 1980, and see R. K. Lewis,
'Consultation and Cuts: The Review of Industrial Injury Benefit', Journal of Social
Welfare Law, (1980), 330.
18
 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury, para. 1014 and similarly see para. 1003.
19
 But see T. G. Ison, 'The Politics of Reform of Personal Injury Compensation', University
of Toronto Law Review, 27 (1977), 385, 398. 'Moreover because of the waste and anomo-
lies that they perpetuate and increase, small steps in the direction of universal dis-
ability insurance may have the appearance of being steps in the wrong direction, while
the truth is that the trouble is caused not by any error in direction but by the decision
to proceed in small steps. The process also tends to expand the numbers of people with
a vested interest in the conglomeration of categorized systems, and for that reason too
many tend to delay rather than advance any more comprehensive reform.'
20
 Justice, Report on Compensation for Victims of Road Traffic Accidents (No-Fault on the
Roads), Stevens & Son, London, 1974, p. 51.
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rejected the ultimate aim of uniform compensation for all accidents. It can-
not defend its piecemeal approach on the basis of any long-term strategy.21
The preferences and anomalies it creates or continues to support would be
here to stay.
In any event, what would be the effectiveness of a long-term strategy
with road accident reform as its first base ? A judgement may be made from
the figures produced by the Pearson Commission itself. Obviously any road
accident scheme will deal largely, if not entirely, with injuries and not
diseases. But injury is the cause of incapacity amongst the disabled in only
10 per cent of cases. Of these a quarter of the injuries are inflicted at work,
and only one in ten occur on the road, whilst the remaining two-thirds of
injuries occur elsewhere and are thus excluded from these preferred groups.22
It can be seen that the erosion of the preference would indeed be gradual.
Road accident reform affects but one in ten of the injured population, and
only one in a hundred of those disabled from all causes.
(2) MAXIMUM EFFECT UPON THE COMPENSATION SYSTEM
The figures in the above paragraph can be used to evaluate the second
reason for the separate treatment of road accidents. This argument is based
upon sheer weight of numbers and implies that reform of road accidents
would have a profound effect upon the overall compensation system. In
Lord Pearson's words: '...motor vehicle injuries occur on a scale not
matched by any other category of accidental injury within our terms of
reference, except work injuries.. .'.2S But it must be remembered that the
Commission's terms of reference did not include investigation of all acci-
dents let alone disabilities in general. This did not prevent consideration of
matters falling outside of these terms when the Commission thought it
necessary24 (as in the recommendation for a disability benefit for all severely
handicapped children26). However, in justifying the separate treatment of
road accidents the narrower perspective derived from a strict view of its
terms of reference was taken. The road accident figures then assume all the
more importance.
21
 A. I. Ogus, P. Corfield and D. R. Harris , 'Pearson: Principled Reform or Political
Compromise?' , Industrial Law Journal, 7 (1978), 143, 146-8. The analysis is repeated by
D. R. Harris in 'An Appraisal of the Pearson Strategy' , in Allen et. al., op. cit. pp . 89-95.
22
 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Fersonal
Injury, Vol. II, tables 2 and 4.
28
 Ibid. Vol. I, para. 996. Similarly Marsh, op. cit. p . 552 sta t ing tha t the road accident
scheme is ' a significant step towards the elimination of anomalies ' .
24
 For a criticism of the Commission's a t t i tude to its terms of reference see Ogus, Corfield
and Harris, op. cit. pp . 144-5.
25
 Report of the Royal Commission on Civi) Liability and Compensation for Persona]
Injury, para. 15}i,
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(3) MINIMUM DISTURBANCE OF EXISTING PRINCIPLES
The next argument concentrates not upon the impact of change in terms
of the numbers of people affected, but instead it stresses that road accident
reform would only cause minimum disturbance to present compensation
principles.26 Road accidents already have their own special rules and even
now road casualties stand a better chance of obtaining monies than other
accident victims. It is argued therefore, that reform would not create any
new preference but only reinforce the status quo. According to Lord
Pearson:
The unique factors of motor vehicle injury have long been recognised by Parlia-
ment. Insurance against third party risks has been compulsory for motor
vehicle users for nearly half a century. In suggesting special compensation
arrangements for motor vehicle injuries we feel we are to a large extent reflecting
accepted priorities.27
Any argument which implies maximum effect in one paragraph and
claims minimum disturbance in the next, invites close scrutiny. It is indeed
true that road accidents already are specially treated by the law of tort: one
in four of those injured gain some compensation from tort, as compared
with one in ten of the industrially injured and only one in sixty-seven of
those injured elsewhere.28 But even so, the introduction of a no-fault road
accident scheme in addition to tort is more than a cosmetic change. As a
result of the scheme the road accident preference will be extended so as to
include an extra 185,000 beneficiaries who would not have been able to
claim under the law of tort.29 These people will not enjoy the lump sums
awarded to tort claimants for they will be the second class social security
group receiving periodic payments. Nevertheless, the position of road acci-
dent victims as a class will be substantially improved. This may be thought
more than the 'reflection of accepted priorities', and could be viewed as the
creation or enhancement of privilege. According to the Disablement Income
Group it would make 'an elite group even more elite.'30
Another argument based in part upon minimum disturbance of existing
principle is that road accidents are easily distinguished from others that
occur and new rules can be applied to them without interfering too much
with the remaining areas of law. If the line of demarcation is a clear one
there is less likelihood of schemes overlapping or disputes arising as to
which set of principles are to apply. If road accidents form this 'self-
26
 See D. W. Elliott and H. Street, Road Accidents, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1968,
p. 250.
27
 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury, para. 907.
2 8
 Ibid. Vol. I, para. 78. Motor injuries account for 58 per cent of total tort payments -
Vol. II, para. 675.
29
 Ibid. para. 1086. 30 The Times, 25 July 1978.
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contained "parcel" ',31 they can be treated separately. Thus the Pearson
Commission in limiting its no-fault scheme to road accidents, stated: 'We
have drawn the boundary at a line we believe would be relatively easy to
determine in practice.'32 However, as the Commission implied, the argu-
ment is subject to qualification for the boundary of any specific scheme will
inevitably be the subject of occasional dispute. Although it may be that the
definition of the road accident scheme will not give rise to the problems
that the industrial injuries scheme has experienced with its formula involv-
ing the course of employment, nevertheless some grey areas are bound to
exist. Would, for example, the scheme compensate on the facts of Perry v.
Kendricks Transport ?33 That was a case where two mischevious boys caused
a petrol tank of an old abandoned bus to explode and this injured another
boy innocently passing by on adjoining land to which the public had access.
As recently noted in connection with the New Zealand no-fault scheme for
all accidents, although 'primary concepts like that of fault liability, dis-
appear, secondary principles, such as causation and natural justice, re-
emerge'.34 The extent to which cause will prove to be a problem for a British
road accident scheme has yet to be determined.
On the whole, it is doubtful whether, for example, accidents in the home
are any less 'self-contained' than road accidents. Already home accidents
are surveyed and reported independently of others,35 yet it is not suggested
that this should lead to a separate compensation scheme for them. In other
words, the justification of minimum disturbance of the existing principles
of compensation might apply to accidents other than those on the road.
(4) THE ESSENTIALLY DANGEROUS NATURE OF MOTOR
VEHICLES
There are several reasons for limiting no-fault insurance - at least at the outset -
to auto accidents. Automobiles are clearly the most dangerous instrumentalities
with which we deal on an everyday basis, and the damage they do to persons and
property reflects this.30
This comment from the leading supporter of road accident reform in the
s l
 Justice Report, op. cit. p . 2. See also the Law Society's evidence to the Commission, Law
Society Gazette, 72 (22 January 1975).
32
 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury, para. 1009.
33
 [1956] 1 All England Reports, 154.
34
 A. Szakats, "The Re-emergence of Common Law Principles in the New Zealand Compen-
sation Scheme', Industrial Law Journal, 7 (1978), 216, 227. See also Trindade, op. cit.
35
 See the Depar tment of Trade's, The Home Accident Surveillance System: The Third
Twelve Months Data, London, 1980.
86
 J. O'Connell, The Injury Industry, University of Illinois Press, 1971, p . 144. See his
urging of reform for this count ry in 'No-Fault Insurance for Great Britain' , industrial
Law Journal, 2 (1973), 187.
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USA has been repeated more than once in this country. Indeed Elliott and
Street had written earlier on a more emotional level:
Mankind has devised a swift-moving machine which is killing and maiming in
ever-increasing numbers every second of the day, and leaving its victims without
necessary financial support. Citizens demand that the law shall not allow this to
happen.87
The Pearson Commission similarly had reference to the dangerous nature
of motor vehicles as characterized by the number and type of injuries they
inflict. The weight attached to the number of accident victims has been
referred to above. But in addition to this the Pearson Commission thought
that the effect of the accident was important in that a road accident was
particularly likely to be the cause of serious injury.38 As a justification for
the separate treatment of road accidents several criticisms can be made.
Firstly the concept of danger is never adequately defined and the risk rate
of one object to another is never properly examined. Is a house dangerous ?
Lord Pearson obviously thought not, but gave little indication of the criteria
for such a decision.39 This amateurism prevalent in the analysis of ultra-
hazardous activities has been discussed elsewhere and need not be repeated
here.40
Secondly, Lord Pearson, having labelled something as dangerous, was
unsure as to what was to be its effect. He accepted that a motor vehicle
might be regarded as a dangerous thing in that technically it could fall
within the category for which proof of fault would not be required to
succeed in tort.41 But nevertheless he refused to place cars in this category
because, he said, to impose this strict liability in tort in addition to a no-
fault scheme outside of tort would place an unfair burden upon the motorist
who would have to pay for both these changes.42 The reasoning here is weak
and easily may be criticized on several grounds. It is sufficient to note that
the existence of a no-fault scheme outside of tort is accepted without ques-
tion. As a result Lord Pearson abjectly fails to consider whether the danger-
ous nature of motor vehicles really merits separate treatment from the other
objects of danger he considered worthy of strict liability in tort, such as
bridges or explosives. The argument of special danger, of itself, will not
37
 Elliott and Street, op. cit. p . 149.
38
 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury, para. 287 and similarly para. 959. Motor vehicle accidents account for 13 per cent
of all injuries, bu t for 17 per cent of hospital in-patient t rea tment for injury and as
much as 34 per cent of all accidental deaths - Vol. II, para. 188.
8B
 But see the two categories described in para. 1643.
40
 See Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, op. cit. n.10, pp . 253-8.
41
 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury, para. 1067.
« Ibid.
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justify two distinct regimes of strict liability, the one based upon a tortious
level of recovery the other upon social security.
The third point is that Lord Pearson fails to give the support he intended
to the more seriously injured, and yet this was his objective in identifying
road accidents as having a serious effect and being of greater danger to
society and therefore worthy of separate treatment. It would be an impor-
tant reform of the present system of compensation if it were to be re-
structured in favour of the seriously injured. But it is doubtful if the road
accident scheme will go very far in this direction. Lord Pearson chose as a
model for the new scheme the present regime for industrial injuries. Despite
the many attractive features of the industrial injuries scheme, it is subject
to the criticism that, like tort, it under compensates the seriously injured
and focuses too much attention upon minor claims.43 Finally, it may again
be asked why Lord Pearson did not compensate for the effects of all serious
accidents not just for those on the road whether serious or not. The absence,
previously described, of any ultimate strategy makes it difficult to defend
the piecemeal reforms proposed.
(5) THE IMPORTANCE OF ROAD TRANSPORT TO SOCIETY
The next argument concentrates upon the importance of road transport to
everyone in the community. Even if an individual does not often travel by
road himself, he lives in a world economically dependent upon such trans-
port. Lord Pearson gave this as a reason for the separate treatment of road
accidents without expanding upon it in any detail. The report states simply:
' . . .road transport itself is an essential part of everyday life, of fundamental
importance to the economy as a whole and to the mobility of individuals.'4*
What may be implied from this?
The suggestion cannot be that with the introduction of a no-fault scheme
more people would use the roads and thus maximize the potential of the
economy. No evidence for such a proposition is put forward. Nor can it be
argued that road transport at present is not being employed in essential
circumstances merely because of the absence of a no-fault scheme. Neither
deterrence nor encouragement of use of the road can be the issue.
A stronger argument would be to place a moral construction upon
Lord Pearson's words: if society takes the economic and social benefits of
43
 See Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, op. cit. p. 243, and similarly in
'What Now?', op. cit. n.10, p. 139. The view is confirmed by the Personal Injury
Survey carried out by the Pearson Commission. See the Report of the Royal Commission
on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury, Vol. II, Chapter 25 and
especially rabies 149-50.
••Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury, para. 996.
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the method of transport it must also take the burden and accept respon-
sibility for road casualties.45 Already such is the case with road safety.
Public bodies, including government itself, have acknowledged a respon-
sibility to prevent accidents. As an.extension of this the Justice Report
argues for a similar communal involvement in compensation for road
accidents as well:
We seem.. .to have tacitly accepted the annual toll of slaughter and maiming as
the price we must pay for the advantages we obtain from the greater mobility of
people and goods, and acceptance of this situation ought to be matched by corre-
spondingly greater and more effective social concern for the needs of its victims.40
A road accident scheme may then be the price demanded for the acceptance
of the benefits of this form of transport together with its inevitable accident
rate. However, this bargain can also be implied when other forms of accident
are being considered. Such disparate events as a railway disaster, a dog bite47
and an injury resulting from defective premises may be considered similarly
inevitable as long as society continues to accept the benefit of running
trains, keeping dogs or living in houses. Yet it is not suggested that such
accidents also be the subject of a no-fault scheme.
(6) THE EQUITY OF RANDOM SELECTION OF VICTIMS
The next argument is essentially egalitarian and yet is used to claim prefer-
ment for road accident victims. It is based upon the justice of compensating
those individuals unlucky enough to be struck down by the blind hand of
fate. The argument applies when there is random selection of those to be
affected; the pool of potential victims (the beneficiaries of the compensation)
must be as wide as society itself and then there is no preferment of any
particular class. As interpreted by supporters of road accident reform, this
argument refuses to identify road casualties as fitting within any particular
group within society, and this ensures that such victims are more deserving
than those whose injuries occur elsewhere, for the latter may be drawn
from but a limited section of society.
Lord Pearson explicitly accepted this justification. He noted that road
accidents are an unavoidable hazard for most of the population48 and are
45
 This argument is adopted by Elliott and Street, op. cit. p. 250. It was made more
explicitly by the Chairman in his dissent in the Report of the New Zealand Committee
on Absolute Liability, 1963, which considered the introduction of absolute liability for
motor vehicles. See Ind. Views, Wild, para. 15.
48
 Justice Report, op. cit. p. 2.
47
 According to the Post Office an average of 173 postmen were bitten each year between
1972-74. This represented an incidence of 1.6 per 1000 postmen. See the Report of the
Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Personal Injury, Vol. II; para. 296:
48
 Ibid. Vol. I, para. 287, and similarly para. 959, 'we doubt whether any other type of
accidental injury has a greater impact on everyday life'.
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therefore to be distinguished from, for example, work accidents.49 Victims
of industrial injury are by and large male manual workers and thus fall
within one section of society, whereas in road accidents the social class is
more diverse and the distribution of injuries between the sexes more equal.60
However, two points need to be made here. First, although it is more
difficult to stereotype the road accident victim, it is still possible to paint a
general picture of the overall incidence of road casualties within particular
sections of society. It is well known, for example, that a teenage motor-cycle
rider is much more likely to be involved in an accident than a car driver
over the age of thirty. It would certainly be untrue to suggest that the
incidence of injury caused by motor vehicles to any particular group of the
population occurs in proportion to the numerical relationship of that group
to the rest of society. In other words, although the picture may be less clear
when considering victims of road accidents as opposed to industrial injuries,
the difference is one of degree rather than kind. It is possible to say that
road accidents are more likely to affect one group of the population rather
than another.51 If this is so, then the justification for their separate treat-
ment becomes much less convincing.
The second point to be made is that the justice of establishing a State
scheme of compensation because of the random incidence of a particular
disability has not been an argument which has led to special compensation,
for example, to sufferers from indiscriminate forms of cancer. Nor has it
been to the fore when existing compensation schemes are being reconsidered.
The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board in distributing monies to victims
of crime favour police officers in 17 per cent of its awards, a far higher
percentage than the proportion of police to ordinary members of the
public.52 Nevertheless, Lord Pearson accepted that the criminal injuries
scheme has come to stay and made no serious attempt to review it on this or
any other ground.53 Again, the argument is that this justification has not
been related to other forms of suffering for which the victims might claim
compensation.
49
 Ibid. para. 996.
00
 Ibid. Vol. II, tables 1 and 2 reveal tha t in industry only 14 per cent of those injured and
2 per cent of those killed are women; on the roads 35 per cent of injuries involve
women.
61
 Ibid. para. 959 and Vol. II, Ch. 7, where Pearson acknowledges this. For detailed analysis
of road accidents see J. Cohen and B. Preston, Causes and Prevention of Road Accidents,
Faber and Faber, London, 1968; M. Aust in, Accident Black Spot, Penguin Books,
Harmondsworth , 1968; F. A. Whitlock, Dea th on the Road: A Study in Social Violence,
Tavistock Publications, London, 1971; J. Macmillan, Deviant Drivers, Saxon House and
Lexington Books, 1975; HMSO, Transport Statistics Great Britain 1968-78.
62
 This is the average figure for the years 1976-8. See The Fourteenth Report of the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Cmnd. 7396, HMSO, London, 1978.
63
 See similarly Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, op. cit. n.10, p . 240.
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(7) PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO SUFFERING
The final argument is based upon the public reaction to road accident
reform and whether such a change would be consonant with accepted
views of morality and justice. On the one hand it has been said that the road
accident figures have little impact on the ordinary citizen. 'Not until a
friend or relation is killed on the road do we begin to be dismayed by this
daily carnage'." Reactions to other forms of disaster are in stark contrast to
this." On the other hand, Elliott and Street argue that traffic accident
victims are seen in a different light from those who suffer an accident in
their home or are plagued by some disease or other. With a cancer sufferer
we are primarily concerned with the provision of medical treatment; with
a road accident victim, it is argued, there is special pressure to settle his
financial needs. 'With traffic victims, whatever the reasons or their intrinsic
merit their claims are talked about and thought to be particularly in need
of fair settlement.>S8 Is this in fact the popular response to these differing
forms of suffering ? If so, to what extent should the law take account of it
and, in particular, is it sufficient to justify special treatment for road accident
victims?
This is not the place to embark upon a detailed examination of the
relationship between law and morality, but again several qualifications to
the attempted justification need to be made. First, there has been little
investigation of the popular sense of justice which is the foundation of the
argument." The Pearson Commission received 'no evidence of a strong
public demand either for or against major changes over the whole area of
our remit'.58 Its road accident scheme was not based upon any empirical
study of the views of the ordinary man as to what was right. If the Pearson
Commission had carried out such an investigation it may have found, as
recent work suggests, that several of the traditional beliefs as to the moral
precepts underpinning our compensation system have little foundation in
fact. For example, it has been shown that the traditional belief that a person
who knows he has been injured through the fault of another will expect
that other to compensate him, is by no means the view of all accident
victims.59 Nevertheless it may be that we do indeed look upon road accident
"* Whitlock, op. cit. p . 7. 88 Ibid. pp . 8-11.
88
 Elliott and Street, op. cit. p . 250.
87
 At iyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, op. cit. pp . 529-31.
88
 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury, para. 241.
89
 The Centre for Socio-Legal Studies a t Oxford mounted a nat ional household survey of
accident victims in 1976-77. Of 439 accident victims w h o blamed someone for their
injury only 229 said tha t they though t tha t person should pay compensation. See
S. Lloyd-Bostock, 'Commonsense Morali ty and Accident Compensat ion ' , in D. P.
Farrington, K. Hawkins and S. Lloyd-Bostock (eds), Psychology, Law and Legal Process,
Macmillan Press, London, 1979, pp . 99-100.
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victims as especially worthy of support. After all, road accidents certainly
receive a disproportionate amount of media coverage and are one of the
most public and visible ways in which injury can be inflicted. If this does in
fact result in a more sympathetic public response to road accidents, a second
qualification to the argument justifying their separate treatment must be
made.
This qualification is that although a difference in attitude may explain
the preferential treatment of one group of disabled as opposed to another,
it may not suffice as a justification to policy makers for the continuation of
the disparity.60 Thus Miers uses the social psychology literature to suggest
an explanation for the creation of special schemes to compensate victims of
crime, but he does not use the differing public perceptions of when compen-
sation is deserved as a justification for separate treatment.*1 To rely upon
popular attitudes towards suffering in order to justify any particular
compensation regime is fraught with difficulty. A person's view of whether
compensation is deserved does not derive exclusively from some 'natural'
sense of justice: it is influenced by the cultural conditioning inevitably
produced by the society in which he lives. His statement as to what is right
may be based more upon his knowledge of the law and what society
presently does rather than upon any idealized intuitive notion of justice.
Thus in examining the moral justification said to be the basis of the award
of compensation from the law of tort Lloyd-Bostock states:
To draw on common sense morality thus seems to be at best a weak justification
of the tort system as reinforcing or perpetuating norms on the grounds that they
have come to be accepted, and perhaps that a change would not be well received.
Questions about the origins and effects in practice of such norms would seem to
be more relevant than the question of whether or not they are currently
accepted.62
Any attempt to justify the road accident scheme by reference to public
attitudes therefore must be viewed with healthy scepticism.
CONCLUSION
This article has considered the major arguments put forward in support of
a separate compensation scheme for the victims of road accidents. Supporters
of reform have not explored in any detail the rationale for separate develop-
ment. In so far as a no-fault road accident scheme is seen as a staging post
on the way to reform of the social security system in general then less time
so 'Even if we are satisfied that the compensation systems existing at present conform to
the popular sense of justice, we are still entitled to ask for rational justification of those
systems.' Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, op. cit. p. 477.
8 1D. R. Miers, Responses to Victimisation, Professional Books, Abingdon, 1978, pp. 33-46.
62
 Lloyd-Bostock, op. cit. p. 07.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 25 Feb 2014 IP address: 131.251.254.13
176 Richard Lewis
need be spent on justifying piecemeal development. But where the piece-
meal reform is seen as being the end in itself, then the reasons for prefer-
ment of one section of society over another must be examined in detail: this
the Pearson Commission failed to do.
One headline writer's acceptance of the Pearson Report as 'a good British
compromise'83 has not been the universal view. In particular, academic
lawyers, notable by their absence from the Commission, have made incisive
criticisms of the proposals.64 It has been accused of 'pragmatism without
principle'85 and the present study further illustrates the Commission's
failure to come to terms with the fundamental questions in the compen-
sation debate. Other Commissions have raised hopes of radical reform based
upon a thorough reappraisal of existing principles only to produce a
compromise document reaffirming the status quo: the Royal Commission on
Legal Services is the most recent example in this regard.68 "Why do certain
Commissions fail to examine in any depth the basic choices in principle
placed before them? With the present concern about the role of Com-
missions in policy making,67 several reasons for the inadequate discussion
of basic issues by the Pearson Commission can be suggested.
The Commission's terms of reference were not designed to encourage an
investigation of all accidents, let alone disablement however caused.88 There
are factors which militate against a Commission's request for revision of its
terms of reference.09 As soon as the guidelines for the work of the Pearson
Commission were established a blue-print was formed for piecemeal reform
without consideration of the wider background. It has been said that 'it is
03
 Law Society Gazette, 75 (22 March 1978), 289.
04
 See Ogus, Corfield and Harris , op. cit.; At iyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law,
op. cit. n.10, p . 240; J. W . Fleming, 'The Pearson Report: Its Strategy' , Modern Law
Review, 42 (1979), 249; R. A. Hasson, ' T h e Pearson Report - Something for Everyone' ,
British Journal of Law and Society, 6 (1979), 119; see A. Tune, Revue Internat ionale de
Droit Compare (1978), 507.
05
 Ogus, Corfield and Harris , op. cit.; Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law,
op. cit. n.10, p . 240.
68
 Report of the Royal Commission on Legal Services (Benson Report), Cmnd. 7648, HMSO,
London, 1979.
07
 See the newsletter of the Royal Inst i tu te of Public Affairs, No. 1 (1980), which calls for
a re-examination of the effectiveness of Royal Commissions, and reported in The Times,
10 Apri l 1980. The concern was prompted by an article in The Times, 5 December 1979,
wr i t t en by the Chairman of the Royal Commission on Gambling, Lord Rothschild. See
also M. Buhner (ed.), Social Research and Royal Commissions, Allen & Unwin , London,
1980.
68
 But the Commission's a t t i tude to its terms of reference has been much criticized. See
. especially Ogus, Harris and Corfield, op. cit. pp . 144-5. A. R. Prest (a member of the
Commission) has said t ha t the terms were drafted ' w i t h obvious and demonstrable
lacunae' . ' See 'Royal Commission Report ing ' , Three Banks Review, 119 (1978), 3, n.5.
69
 R. A. Chapman, The Role of Commissions in Policy Making, Allen & Unwin , Royal
Inst i tute of Public Administrat ion Studies, London, 1973, pp . 176-7. T. J. Cartwright ,
Royal Commissions and Depar tmenta l Committees in Britain, Hodder & Stoughton,
London, 1975. G. Rhodes, Committees of Inquiry, Allen & Unwin , London, 1975.
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hardly surprising that Commissions sometimes draw attention in their final
reports to the constraints imposed by their terms of reference',70 and the
Pearson Commission often had resort to this excuse for its failure to con-
sider any long-term strategy for the provision of social security.
The seventeen members of the Commission included representatives of
the Law Society and the insurance world as well as directors of industry,
trade unionists and academics. The Commission was seriously divided on
many issues and it admitted eventually that there were three 'schools of
thought' as to the ultimate objectives to be attained.71 Some of the causes of
such division were referred to as long ago as 1910 in the report of the
Departmental Committee on the Procedure of Royal Commissions.72 'A
Commission selected on the principle of representing various interests starts
with a serious handicap against the probability of harmony in its work,
and perhaps even of practical result from its labours.. .there has been a
recent tendency to make the membership of Commissions too large.' These
difficulties were not to be overcome by authoritarian chairmanship: Lord
Pearson73 was not the sort of dominant character to ride roughshod over the
views of dissentient members (as appears to have happened in the Royal
Commission for Legal Services).
In such a context it may be appreciated that rather than discuss whether
road accidents deserve a special compensation scheme, it is easier to point to
several possible alternative methods of funding the scheme, and debate
which of them would be the most efficient. Those within the particular
school of thought which saw one compensation scheme for all forms of dis-
ablement as 'a socially desirable objective'74 tempered their views in the
light of what they believed could be achieved in the short term. As a result,
it is said that the Commission 'loses its raison d'etre when it abandons the
search for statements of principle and tries to act as a broker between
various competing groups. The task of making political compromises is best
left to politicians'.78
For all its compromises the report has not gained the political acceptance
70
 Chapman, op. cit.
71
 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury, paras. 1713-18.
72
 Report of the Depar tmenta l Committee on the Procedure of Royal Commissions chaired
by Lord Balfour), Cd. 5235, 1910, para. 15. Similarly Chapman, op. cit. p . 187 arguing
tha t there is now ' a need for inquiries under taken by much smaller committees of
experts and for advisory bodies consti tuted on entirely different bases' .
73
 In the addendum to Lord Pearson's obi tuary notice in The Times, 7 February 1980, Lord
Allen (a member of the Commission) paid tr ibute to Lord Pearson's patience, courtesy
and openmindedness, and to ' h i s gentle bu t effective chairmanship of a large Com-
mission which included members wi th widely differing backgrounds ' .
7
* Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal
Injury, para. 1714.
75
 Hasson, op. cit. pp . 125-6.
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for which its authors may have hoped. A Commissioner has referred to ' the
fairly tepid reaction of Parliament and Government even to the limited
proposals of the Commission.'76 Very few of its suggestions have been taken
up and it now bears the hallmark of yet another pigeonholed Royal Com-
mission report. To explain why the report has not been effective and has
lacked 'political sex appeal'" would be to go beyond the scope of this article,
but one of the reasons may have been its failure to embrace any broad plan
of social policy which attempted to justify the detailed proposals it made.
It may be that in future years the newsworthy road accident scheme will
re-emerge as a likely candidate for approval in extending the boundaries of
social security. If so, the reasons given for its implementation must be
closely examined. Why this particular preferential benefit is created may
reveal strategies fundamental to the future development of the welfare
state. The new scheme may be based upon clearly articulated aims as to
how disablement is to be compensated, or alternatively, it may emerge from
the continued absence of any overall framework of social policy. If from
the latter, this article has attempted to show that such a piecemeal reform
would be akin to that proposed by the Pearson Commission: it would be a
cause of dissatisfaction not only for the various groups of disabled, but also
for all serious students of the welfare state.
78
 Marsh, op. cit.
77
 See Lord Rothschild, op. cit. 'The trouble about royal commissions is that they rarely,
if ever, have any political sex appeal.'
